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ABSTRACT 
 
Behavior within an experiment is generally explained by either a pure profit 
motive or a response to the context of the experiment which is likely driven by 
different factors such as individuals' environmental friendliness. Are participants in 
laboratory experiments responding to the context of the experimental setting and 
not merely to a profit motive? Using a preliminary analysis, I draw evidence from 
data collected in a two-stage laboratory experiment designed and conducted by 
Palm-Forster et al. (In Press) at the University of Delaware. In the first stage of the 
experiment, participants performed a series of tasks concerning their tradeoffs 
between monetary profits and environmental friendliness. In the second stage, 
participants made a choice of donating to a large environmental organization. In 
total, 156 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. The analysis in 
this paper provides preliminary results that need to be verified in future research 
after overcoming key model specification issues.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last few decades have witnessed vast technological advances bringing along with it 
unfavorable byproducts that interfere with and have had lasting impacts on the 
ecosystems. Therefore, there arises a need to understand the importance of conservation 
and ecosystem preservation and the steps to remedy the disruption. According to the 
Glossary of Environment Statistics, ‘environmental protection’ can be categorized as the 
activity to preserve or restore the quality of environmental media by reducing the 
production of pollutants or the presence of polluting substances which encompasses 
changes in production techniques and consumption habits (Glossary of Environment 
Statistics, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67, United Nations, New York, 1997). 
With the growing need for awareness and conservation, there has also been a 
remarkable increase in the number of environmental organizations catering to a host of 
problems at a national and international level most of which are non-governmental, not-
for-profit organizations. One of the most important roles that these Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) can play in global environmental governance, is to provide up-to-
date information on critical issues in their respective fields. Addressing problematic areas 
also becomes easier in the absence of bureaucracy.  
While the problems addressed by these organizations are all important, it is of 
note that they are all run with motives to restore ecological balance and not profit 
maximization. In other words, a nonprofit reinvests the money it makes back into its 
causes and missions instead of dividing profits among its employees or 
shareholders.  The principal sum and subsequent money is obtained by way of 
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governmental grants or charitable donations. This means, lesser donations have a 
negative impact on the effectiveness of the NGOs.  
 The Chesapeake Bay foundation as stated on their web page, is one such 
organization that works to reduce pollution emissions in the Chesapeake Bay and its 
rivers and streams. Founded in 1967, the organization aims at educating, advocating and 
restoring the water quality in the Bay by reduction of toxins and improving oxygen 
levels. 
Given the importance of donations to these organizations as they facilitate 
functioning, in order to understand human behavior, economists have turned to the 
method of experimental models used in the physical sciences. Applying a ceteris paribus 
condition, it becomes easier to observe behavioral patterns from different individuals 
which would otherwise be very difficult. These behavioral traits can be explained by 
different motives that drive an individuals’ decision making. As Orne (1962) points out, 
the behavior of a subject is a reflection of their perception of the experiment which may 
differ from the views of the experimenter. Thus, providing context to the experiment may 
help elicit better responses from participants. 
In this major paper, I observe individual behavioral patterns in the context of 
nonpoint source (NPS) pollution1 theory with respect to decisions that lead to income 
																																								 																				
1	According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2018, “Nonpoint source pollution 
generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage or 
hydrologic modification. Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from industrial and 
sewage treatment plants, comes from many diffuse sources. NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or 
snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away 
natural and human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal 
waters and ground waters.” 
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generation. In the beginning of the experiment collected and owned by Palm-Forster et 
al., (in press), participants were provided a text about nonpoint source pollution and at the 
end of the experiment, participants were presented with a donation decision to an 
organization (The Chesapeake Bay Foundation) who’s objective is to address the 
problem of NPS pollution. In this major paper, I study if an individual in the 
experimental setting responds to the context provided. 
Using the experimental data collected and owned by Palm-Forster et al. (in press), 
that employs a two-stage laboratory experiment, I observe participant’s behavior within a 
laboratory setting. In the first stage, participants were provided with a set of instructions 
after which they made management decisions that determined their earnings at the end of 
the game. In the second stage, participants filled out a short demographic survey after 
which they chose whether or not to donate to an environmental organization from their 
respective payout. 
First stage management decisions included the choice of a conservation 
technology or a conventional technology and a management decision that collectively 
determined a pollution outcome in a nonpoint source pollution game. The take home 
earnings of a participant comprised of a general income awarded to the individual, net 
production income resulting from management decisions, minus the cost of a 
conservation technology when adopted. Choosing to adopt a conservation technology 
would result in a negative impact on payout by increasing costs of production on the one 
hand and yield a positive impact on the environment by reducing pollution on the other 
hand. The donation decision in the second stage of the experiment was a voluntary 
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payout made from the amount that the participant earned through decisions taken in the 
first stage of the experiment. 
The assumption is that, adopting a conservation technology or reducing the 
quantity of inputs to production can reduce the level of pollution emitted by the firm. A 
decision to donate would result in a decrease in total payout to the participant. Hence, 
participants that are driven by a pure profit motive would maximize their utility by 
adopting the conventional (free) technology, polluting at a level that maximizes their 
profits and opting not to donate. However, if a participant chooses decisions that result in 
low pollution which could be driven by the adoption of the costly conservation 
technology, and/or chooses to donate, this signals to the experimental investigator a non-
profit motive. Rather, the existence of a context driven response. Our goal is to study 
whether participants in a laboratory setting respond to the context of the experimental 
setting.   
Preliminary estimation results suggest a negative relationship between individual 
pollution levels and the amount donated at the end of the experiment. Simply put, a 
participant making decisions to pollute less is more likely to donate more. Further, 
individuals that received lower earnings were more likely to donate to the Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation. These results are based a convenient model estimation strategy and need 
to be verified by future research. 
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section covers the 
literature that has been reviewed in relevance of this study, followed by the theoretical 
framework and the design of the experiment which was sourced from Palm-Forster et al. 
(in press). Next, I employ a linear regression technique to estimate the presence of a 
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context motive which is presented in the results section, followed by a conclusion that 
includes scope for further improvement. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
One of the methodological achievements of experimental economics is the ability to 
create experimental settings that are designed to resemble real world settings with 
features such as institutional rules, endowments and incentives which are essential in 
making predictions based on economic theory about behavior (Smith, 1982). When 
observing an individual’s behavior in a laboratory setting, one must therefore consider 
different aspects that might influence behavioral patterns.  
In the following subsections, I first review literature based on behavior in the 
context of NPS pollution, then I review individuals’ donation behavior followed by 
donation behavior to environmental organizations and lastly, I review literature on the 
influence of context to behavior in an experiment. 
	
2.1. Individuals’ behavior in the context of nonpoint source pollution 
The pollution of an individual is difficult to observe with respect to nonpoint pollution 
problems when observing ambient pollution levels as the pollution levels are based on a 
random distribution of abatement technologies adopted and only the combined effects are 
observed. Offering an incentive for total pollution levels can help control for this 
(Segerson, 1986). In general, with an incentive scheme in play, an individual or firm will 
start responding to cumulative pollution emissions (Xepapadeas,1992). Employing 
different treatments including a no policy control, Palm- Forster et al. (in press) controls 
for this potential problem by imposing penalties for total pollution of a group exceeding a 
pre-determined limit. Since the current paper utilizes data from Palm-Forster et al. (in 
press), the issue of observing individual pollution is considered here.  
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2.2. Individual donation behavior 
In the past half century, there has been a large flow of charitable gifts irrespective of 
economic conditions (List, 2011). Traditionally, a pure altruistic approach would explain 
motivations to donation (Andreoni, 1989). However, there may be other factors that 
influence donation such as the feel-good factor or a ‘warm-glow’ obtained from the act of 
giving (Andreoni, 1989) or social pressure (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). The pure 
altruism model suggests that giving is solely motivated by the output of the charity, but 
an impure altruistic model looks at the influence of a warm-glow experienced by the 
donor (Vesterlund et al., 2008). While these explain motivations to donation, an 
individual may not want to give but may dislike saying no, for example, due to social 
pressure (DellaVigna et al., 2012). Within a laboratory however, there may be different 
motivations that drive giving. It could be driven by a profit motive, social pressure or 
individual perception driven by the context of the experiment. In this study, the social 
pressure aspect is controlled for by design of the experiment collected and owned by 
Palm-Forster et al., (in press) wherein participants are ensured complete anonymity. An 
individual operating with a profit motive would be less likely to donate. However, if 
decisions are driven by the participants perception or the context of the experiment, the 
individual would be more likely to donate. 
 
2.3. Donation behavior to environmental organizations 
Mazar and Zhong (2010) remark that the recent growth of the market for environmentally 
friendly products reflects a change in the social and moral values of consumers. Their 
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studies show that exposure to an environmentally friendly product would result in a more 
altruistic behavioral pattern. Purchasing choices reflect not only price and quality 
preferences (Monroe, 1976), but also reflect an individual’s beliefs, values and norms 
(Caruana, 2007). Therefore, in an experiment involving donation to an environmental 
organization, providing information on the background and mission of the respective 
organization can increase expose and thereby increase donations. 
 
2.4. Influence of context on participants’ behavior in experiments 
Contextual factors appear to have a significant impact on actions (Levitt and List, 2007). 
In a series of experiments conducted by Henrich et al. (2005), it was found that a group 
of participants receiving identical instructions about the description of the game, payoffs 
and incentives, responded differently based on the context that the participants 
themselves brought to the game. An experimental investigator could lack complete 
control over the entire context within which a decision is made (Harrison and List, 2004). 
Therefore, providing context can provide a better understanding of a particular 
environment and reduce confusion among participants. With decisions regarding 
pollution choices or concerning bribes, contextual instructions could affect behavior in 
the experiment, but this effect could be desirable as it is related to the research question 
(Alekseev et al., 2016). 
The above literature review reveals significant research on donation behavior and 
individual’s behavior in an experiment. However, there seems to be a gap in the literature 
addressing motivation to donation observed in experimental settings. Although this paper 
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is based on the experimental data sourced from Palm-Forster et al. (in press), it differs 
from and contributes to the existing literature by addressing the gap in the literature 
considering motivations to individual’s donation behavior to an environmental 
organization within an experiment. In addition to a profit motive, I observe if context of 
the experiment plays a role in decision making within a laboratory. Results suggest that 
an individual choosing environmentally friendly decisions and polluting less, is more 
likely to donate more at the end of the experiment indicating that participants do respond 
to context. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Structure of the theory 
 
As shown in figure 3.1, an individuals’ behavior within a laboratory setting can be 
broadly driven by motives such as that of pure profit, the context of the experiment or 
others such as warm-glow effect or an altruistic approach. With relevance to this study, I 
consider two motives that impact behavior, namely profit and context. An individual 
responding to a pure profit motive is found to make decisions that result in higher 
pollution emissions and solely enhance take home earnings at the end of the experiment. 
On the other hand, if a participant is responding to the context of the experiment, the 
decisions arising from this does not increase profit. Rather, it translates to 
environmentally friendly decisions resulting in low pollution emissions coupled with the 
choice to donate at the end of the experiment.  
Motives 
Pollution Context 
Profit 
Others 
Technology 
Choice 
Management 
Decision 
Firm Profit 
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Pollution emission is determined by the management decision of the firm as well as 
the choice of technology. Following Palm-Forster et al. (in press), the firm’s profit-
maximization problem is given by 
maxxi,ai p(xi, ai) = g + b(xi) – c*ai      (1) 
Where g is the subsidy/government benefit provided to each firm earning a net 
production income of b(xi) with xi representing the quantity of inputs used in production. 
It is assumed that there is no additional cost for the adoption of the conventional 
technology. Therefore, the cost of adopting the conservation technology is denoted by c, 
and the charge associated with the choice of technology is denoted by c*ai. From this 
design, a negative correlation can be expected between the choice of technology adopted 
and firm profit. 
Considering the individuals that decided to donate at the end of the experiment, I 
observe if their decisions were based on underlying ideas or a consistent profit motive. 
This is observed by the choices made by the individual in the production process, 
wherein adopting a conservation technology would have a negative impact on payout by 
increasing costs of production but a positive impact on the environment by reducing 
pollution emission. In addition, I observe the existence of a relationship between 
donations and the level of pollution emitted. These explanations lead to the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: There is no correlation between individual pollution and donation 
In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate the following regression equation. 
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Individual pollutionij = b0 + b1donate + b2 gender + b3 economic classes + b4 age + b5 
international + µij          (2) 
where individual pollutionij is an outcome determined by the choice of technology 
adopted by the individual ‘i’ in round ‘j’ expressed in unit terms. bn represents the 
coefficients of the independent variables. Donate is a dummy variable which takes the 
binary values of 0 and 1. If a participant chose to donate at the end of the experiment this 
takes the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. b2, b3, b4 and b5 represents the coefficients of 
demographic details such gender, number of economic classes taken, age and whether or 
not the student is an international candidate. µij is the error term of the specification using 
pooled data. If an individual is responding to the context of the experiment, we expect b1 
to have a negative sign, indicating a negative relationship between donations and 
individual pollution. 
 
H2: There is no correlation between firm profit and donation 
To test the above hypothesis, the following regression equation has been estimated 
Firm profitij = a0 +  a1donate + a2 gender + a3 economic classes + a4 age + a5 
international + eij         (3) 
where firm profitij is an outcome determined by the receipt of subsidy, choice of 
technology adopted by the individual ‘i’ in round ‘j’. an represents the coefficients of the 
independent variables. Donate is a dummy variable which takes the binary values of 0 
and 1. If a participant chose to donate at the end of the experiment this takes the value of 
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1 and 0 otherwise. a2, a3, a4 and a5 represents the coefficients of demographic details 
such gender, number of economic classes taken, age and whether or not the student is an 
international candidate. eij is the error term of the specification using pooled data. If an 
individual is responding to the context of the experiment, we expect a1 to have a negative 
sign. 
The above two hypotheses along with the result are tabulated below in table 3.1 
 
Table 3.1: Research hypotheses 
Research Question Null Hypotheses Test Result and Interpretation 
 
Are participants in a 
laboratory experiment 
responding to the context of 
the experimental setting and 
not merely to a profit 
motive? 
b1= 0 (There is no 
correlation between 
individual pollution and 
donation) 
p < 0.01 Reject. Lower the individual 
pollution, higher the amount 
donated  𝛼1= 0 (There is no 
correlation between 
profits and donation) 
p < 0.01 Reject. lower the firm 
profits, higher the amount of 
donation. 
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4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
This section of the paper is based on the experimental design and data collected at the 
University of Delaware by Dr. Palm-Forster, Dr. Messer and Dr. Suter who have kindly 
granted me permission to analyze this dataset for the purpose of my major paper. Below 
is a summarized description of their design which is described in more detail in Palm- 
Forster et al. (in press)2. 
Using the data collected, I observe participant’s behavior within the setting of a 
laboratory experiment collected in the Spring of 2016 at the University of Delaware. A 
total of 156 undergraduate students were recruited using lists managed by the Department 
of Economics. The only information provided to participants at this stage was an e-mail 
stating that they were selected to participate in a study that involved decision-making and 
would take approximately 90 minutes with an average payout of $30. The minimum and 
maximum payout to participants at the end of the experiment amounted to $21.50 and 
$72.75 respectively. Since the average sum per hour was up to $20, this was similar to 
payments resulting from other experiments such as Fooks et al., (2016), Arnold et al., 
(2013), Messer et al., (2014) and Suter et al., (2012). 
The experiment consisted of six stages in total. In the first stage, participants 
received audio as well as written instructions about the experiment. In the second stage, 
they were asked to participate in a practice round which had no implications on the 
																																								 																				
2	For finer details please refer to Palm-Forster, L.H., J.F. Suter, and K.D. Messer. In Press. “Experimental 
evidence on policy approaches that link agricultural subsidies to water quality outcomes.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aay057	
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payment received. This was to ensure participants understood the details of experiment. 
In the third stage, individuals took part in the experiment, which was similar to the 
practice round but decisions from this round had financial implications on profit earned. 
In the fourth stage, participants took part in an adapted Holt-Laury lottery which helped 
the experimental investigator gain insight on respective risk preferences. The fifth stage 
involved a short demographic survey on details such as gender, race, age, number of 
economic classes taken as well as if the student was a domestic or international 
candidate. In the final part of the experiment, participants were provided with a short 
script about the Chesapeake Bay foundation and they were given a choice to donate to the 
respective organisation. Any donation made was deducted from the total earnings at the 
end of the experiment. 
All of the firms in their group were identical in terms of potential net production 
income, profits, and pollution relationships. Between each student, there were privacy 
barriers setup to avoid other participants from viewing an individual’s screen. Individuals 
were randomly assigned to a six-person group that they were unable to identify. This 
ensured complete anonymity in the responses received.  
 Each experimental session consisted of four treatments (C1, T2, T3 and T4) with 
each treatment comprising of five decision rounds. In each of the rounds, participants 
were given the choice to simultaneously choose between a costly conservation 
technology or a conventional technology and one of ten management decisions (refer to 
table:4.1). The choice of the management decision coupled with the technology choice 
jointly determined the pollution outcome. At the beginning of every round participants 
were awarded 400 experimental dollars which resembled a subsidy. The cost of the 
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conservation technology was 150 experimental dollars which was subtracted from the 
firm’s profits for each round of the game when chosen. 
The four treatments included a no policy control (C1) in which the choice of a 
management decision with high levels of pollution had no negative financial implication 
on the participant. The cost of adopting the conservation technology to reduce pollution 
was fixed at 150 experimental dollars for every treatment. In the linear tax treatment 
(T2), if the total pollution of the group exceeded a specified threshold, each firm paid a 
linear tax for every unit of pollution above the said limit. In the linear subsidy reduction 
(T3), instead of a linear tax, if the total pollution exceeded the threshold limit, each firm 
within the group incurred a subsidy reduction for every unit of pollution above the limit. 
The limit of subsidy reduction was capped at 400 experimental dollars which was the 
subsidy received at the beginning of each round. T4 was similar to T3 in terms of linear 
subsidy reduction for total pollution emissions above the limit. However, in this 
treatment, if a firm adopted the costly conservation technology there was an assurance of 
no penalty.  
After the experiment, individuals participated in an adapted Holt-Laury (2002) 
risk-elicitation procedure that helped ascertain risk preferences. Participants were then 
instructed to fill out a short survey that collected demographic data such as gender, age, 
race, academic major, home state or country and number of economic courses taken.  
At the end of the survey, participants were provided a description about an 
environmental organization as shown in figure 4.1, that comprised of details such as 
when the organization was founded, what it stands for, and a short note on what it aims at 
achieving. The organization used in this experiment was the Chesapeake Bay foundation 
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whose motto is to reduce pollution in the Bay, it’s rivers and streams. Students were then 
given the option to donate to the organization. If an individual opted to donate to the 
organization, this sum was deducted from the net profits earned at the end of the 
experiment. The description and donation information provided to all the participants 
were identical. All decisions were made within privacy barriers to control for a social 
pressure motive and payout electronically calculated at the end of the experiment. The 
range of donations were found to range from $0 to $10 with a total of 23 participants 
choosing to donate. 
In the experiment instructions, participants were told that their decisions impacted 
the level of NPS pollution generated by their firm in the experimental setting. This 
provided the individual with the context within which the experiment was set. The tasks 
and decision making that were asked of the participants all linked to this underlying text. 
By concluding the experiment with a donation decision to a real environmental 
organisation that works towards mitigating water pollution helps the experimental 
investigator to analyse if responses are context driven. 
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot of donation information provided 
 The take-home final earnings of an individual consisted of the net profits earned 
through the experiment with $600 experimental dollars equivalent to $1 plus the payout 
from the risk-elicitation procedure minus the donation.  
 (Refer to source: Palm-Forster et al. (in press), for finer details on the experimental 
design.) 
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Table 4.1: Emissions and Profits related to management decisions 
 
Management 
Decision 
 
General 
Earnings 
 
Net 
Production 
Income 
        Technology 1 
       (Conventional) 
 Profit          Emissions 
      Technology 2 
    (Conservational) 
Profit            Emissions 
A 400 40 440 0.0 290 0.0 
B 400 150 550 1.0 400 0.5 
C 400 240 640 2.0 490 1.0 
D 400 310 710 3.0 560 1.5 
E 400 360 760 4.0 610 2.0 
F 400 390 790 5.0 640 2.5 
G 400 400 800 6.0 650 3.0 
H 400 390 790 7.0 640 3.5 
I 400 360 760 8.0 610 4.0 
J 400 310 710 9.0 560 4.5 
Source: Palm-Forster et al. (in press). 
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5. RESULTS 
 
From the data collected and owned by Palm-Forster et al. (in press), I observe 
individual behavior within an experimental setting. A participant could either be driven 
by a pure profit motive and make decisions to stimulate earnings at the end of the 
experiment or could be influenced by the context of the experiment and make 
environmentally friendly choices. An individual who adopts the costly conservation 
technology thereby polluting less, coupled with a decision to donate at the end of the 
experiment is understood as being responsive to the context of the setting. It is observed 
that individuals that choose lower pollution levels are more likely to donate. I further 
analyse the relationship between firm profits and individual pollution. A negative 
correlation suggests that an individual that earns lower profits from the experiment is 
more likely to make a donation. It is to be noted that the results from this paper are 
preliminary and not based on the best available model specifications. 
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of key variables  
 
Variable Description Mean Min Max Observations 
Gender 1 if participant is male, 0 
otherwise 
0.57 0 1 156 
Donate 1 if participant donated, 0 
otherwise 
0.15 0 1 156 
Donate amount Amount donated at the end 
of the experiment 
0.40 0 10 156 
Age Age of participant 25 19 31 156 
International 1 if participant is 
international, 0 otherwise 
0.24 0 1 156 
Economics 
classes 
Number of economics 
classes the participant had 
taken prior to the current 
semester 
3.28 0 50 156 
Lottery 
winnings 
Amount a participant won 
from the lottery 
3.29 0 39 156 
Individual 
pollution 
Pollution generated by an 
individual 
5.7 0 9 156 
Individual tax Tax an individual incurred 
when pollution exceeded the 
threshold limit 
23.9 0 468 156 
Firm profit Amount earned as a result 
of subsidy received, net 
production income and 
choice of technology 
722.68 290 800 156 
Note: Averages computed by the author. Data taken from Palm-Forster et al. (in press). 
	
From Table 5.1, it is observed that 57% of the participants were male. Out of the 
156 participants, 23 individuals donated to the environmental organisation which is 
approximately 15% of the sample. The average donation amount was $0.4 U.S dollars 
and the mode of donations among individuals who donated was $2 U.S dollars. 
Participants were at an average of 25 years old with approximately 24% comprising of 
international students. On average, participants had taken 3 economics classes. Out of the 
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156 participants, 26 won the lottery with average winnings summing up to $19.76 U.S 
dollars. The average individual pollution choices were found to be at 5.7 which is almost 
at the profit maximizing decision choice as per table 1.1 that lists management choices. 
The individual tax that a participant incurred when the total pollution in the watershed 
exceeded a specified limit was found to be 23.9 experimental dollars. Mean individual 
firm profits calculated as a function of subsidy received, net production income, minus 
the cost of technology was found to be 722.68 experimental dollars. 
Figure 5.1 exhibits the results of the binary choice of donation. Out of 156 
participants 15 percent chose to donate at the end of the experiment. 
  
Figure 5.1: Donation choice 
  
No
85% 
Yes
15%
	23	
	
 Figure 5.2 exhibits the range of donations that participants chose at the end of the 
experiment. The majority of donations were centered at $0 with 133 participants 
choosing not to donate. These participants are assumed to be comparatively lesser 
environmentally friendly compared to the participants that donated. A total of 23 
participants were found to donate. From this figure, I find that the mode of donations was 
at $2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Donation amount including 0 donation 
 
Figure 5.3 exhibits the distribution in the individual pollution levels. From this 
figure, I find that a majority of participants chose to pollute at 3. The second highest 
pollution choice is seen to at 6 which the level of pollution at the highest profit level. 
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Figure 5.3: Individual pollution 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of technology adoption between participants including 
T4 wherein the adoption of the technology resulted in a no penalty on subsidy 
irrespective of pollution emission in the watershed. Out of a total of 3120 observations, 
the costly conservation technology was adopted 533 times. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Technology choice including T4  
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Figure 5.5 exhibits the choice of technology in C1 exclusively. In this treatment, a higher 
pollution choice had no financial penalty. Individuals who adopted the expensive 
conservation technology in this no policy treatment round are assumed to be more 
environmentally friendly. The conservation technology was chosen 21 times out of 780 
observations. 
  
  
Figure 5.5: Technology choice C1 
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5.1. Linear Least Squares Regression Estimation 
 
Although each individual participated in 20 rounds in the experiment, resulting in a panel 
structure for the data, this paper does not account for either random of fixed effects. A 
linear least squares regression using pooled data attempts to model the relationship 
between two variables by fitting a linear equation to observed data points. One variable is 
considered to be a dependent variable and the other is considered an explanatory variable. 
Here I do not necessarily observe a causal relationship but rather a correlation between 
the dependent and independent variables. 
To test the first hypothesis, I observe the relationship between individual pollution 
and donation amount. Represented in equation (2), the firm's individual pollution is the 
dependent variable and the donation amount is the explanatory variable. A negative 
coefficient of the independent variable or donation amount indicates a negative 
relationship between the dependent (individual pollution) and the independent variable 
(donation amount). In other words, as the individual pollution decreases, one can expect 
the donation amount to increase.  
 To test the second hypothesis, I observe the relationship between firm profits and 
donation amount. In this estimation, the firm profit is considered as the dependent 
variable and the donation amount as the independent variable. A negative correlation 
indicates lower the firm profits, higher the donation amount. 
The estimation results from running a linear regression are summarized in table 
5.1.1 and table 5.1.2. 
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Table: 5.1.1: Linear least squares regression estimation to test the correlation between 
individual pollution and donation 
Variable 
(Dependent variable = 
individual pollution) 
                                     Coefficients 
 
                     (A)                                           (B) 
Donation amount -.0511*** 
(0.0161) 
-.0595*** 
(.0162) 
T2 -2.4568*** 
(.0549) 
-2.4568*** 
(.0544) 
T3 -2.4213*** 
(.0549) 
-2.4213*** 
(.0544) 
T4 -2.3581*** 
(.0549) 
 
Gender - .1787*** 
(.0303) 
Economic classes - .0010*** 
(.0002) 
Age - -.0001** 
(.0000) 
International - -.1797*** 
(.0302) 
Intercept 5.7183*** 
(.03935)  
5.774*** 
(.0687) 
Observations 3100 3100 
F statistic 726.93  377.30 
R squared 0.48 0.49 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. *** 1% significance ** 5% significance * 10% 
significance  
 
From the above estimation results using the no policy control (C1) as the baseline I 
observe the correlation between individual pollution and donation amount. In 
specification (A), I find a statistically significant negative correlation between individual 
pollution and donation amount. This indicates that an individual making decisions that 
result in a low pollution level is more likely to donate more at the end of the experiment. 
For every 1 dollar increase in donation, individual pollution decreased by 0.05 units. As 
compared to the no policy control (C1), individuals in the treatments T2, T3 and T4 are 
found to be polluting less as shown by the negative signs of the estimated coefficients of 
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T2, T3 and T4 respectively. These coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Forty 
eight percent of the variation in individual pollution is explained by specification A. 
Controlling for demographic variables such as respondent’s age, gender, number 
of economic classes taken and if the student is international, I estimate the correlation 
between individual pollution and donation amount in specification (B). Comparing 
specification A and B, the negative sign is consistent. Here, for every 1 dollar increase in 
donation, individual pollution decreases by 0.06 units. Forty nine percent of the variation 
in individual pollution is explained by specification B. I thus find a 1 percent increase in 
the R squared value which can be explained by addition of the demographic variables. 
From the demographic variables, I find a positive correlation in gender and economic 
classes to individual pollution. Men were more likely to choose higher levels of pollution 
and also, the higher the number of economic classes taken, the more likely is the 
individual to choose a higher pollution choice. On the other hand, older and international 
students were more likely to choose lower pollution levels.  
Consistent with (A), the correlation between individual pollution and donation 
amount is found to be statistically significant and negative with an increase in magnitude. 
This negative correlation suggests that lower pollution level choices are likely to be 
followed by higher donation amounts. I further test this using our second hypothesis 
using firm profits as the dependant variable and donation amount as the explanatory 
variable. The results are summarized in table 5.1.2. 
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Table 5.1.2: Linear least squares regression estimation to test the correlation between firm 
profits and donation 
 
                      Variable 
(Dependent variable = firm 
profit) 
                         Coefficients 
                      (A)                                                (B) 
Donation amount -2.6872*** 
(.9217) 
-3.1226*** 
(.9260) 
T2 -82.1678*** 
(3.1372) 
-82.1677*** 
(3.1132) 
T3 -79.3032*** 
(3.1372) 
-79.3032*** 
(3.1132) 
T4 -101.4968*** 
(3.1372) 
-101.4968*** 
(3.1132) 
Gender - 9.4197*** 
(1.7306) 
Economic classes - .0560*** 
(.0138) 
Age - -.0029* 
(.0016) 
International - -9.4729*** 
(1.7289) 
Intercept 789.4275*** 
(2.2483) 
791.5393*** 
(3.9299) 
Observations 3100 3100 
F statistic 309.68  163.73 
R squared 0.28 0.30 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. *** 1% significance ** 5% significance * 10% 
significance  
Similar to table 5.1.1, using the no policy control (C1) as the baseline I observe the 
correlation between firm profits and donation amount. In specification (A), I find a 
statistically significant negative correlation between profits and donation amount. This 
indicates that an individual making decisions that results in low take-home earnings is 
more likely to donate more at the end of the experiment. For every 1 dollar increase in 
donation, profits decreased by 2.69 experimental dollars. As compared to the no policy 
control (C1), individuals in the treatments T2, T3 and T4 are found to be earning less 
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profits as shown by the negative signs of the estimated coefficients of T2, T3 and T4 
respectively. These coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Twenty eight 
percent of the variation in individual profits is explained by specification A. 
Controlling for demographic variables such as respondent’s age, gender, number 
of economic classes taken and if the student is international, I estimate the correlation 
between firm profits and donation amount in specification (B). Comparing specifications 
A and B, the negative sign is consistent. Here, for every 1 dollar increase in donation, 
profits decrease by 3.12 experimental dollars. Thirty percent of the variation in individual 
profits is explained by specification B. I thus find a two percent increase in the R squared 
value which can be explained by addition of the demographic variables. From the 
demographic variables, I find a positive correlation in gender and economic classes to 
profits earned. Men were more likely to make profit maximizing decisions and also, the 
higher the number of economic classes taken, the more likely is the individual to earn a 
higher profit. On the other hand, older and international students were more likely to earn 
less. Consistent with (A), the correlation between firm profits and donation amount is 
found to be statistically significant and negative with an increase in magnitude. This 
negative correlation suggests that decisions leading to a lower profit are likely to be 
followed by higher donation amounts.  
From table 5.1.1 I find the individuals choosing lower pollution levels were more 
likely to donate at the end of experiment. Further, from table 5.1.2, participants earning 
lower profits were also more likely to donate to the Chesapeake Bay Foundation. This 
suggests that context does influence an individual's behavior in an experimental setting.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Context in an experiment can influence participants behavior. When observing an 
individual’s behavior within a laboratory setting, it may be noteworthy to consider 
different aspects that could influence behavioral patterns. In this paper, I study whether 
behavior is influenced by a pure profit motive or driven by the context of the 
experimental setting employing the two-stage laboratory experiment of Palm-Forster et 
al. (in press). In the first stage an individual’s behavior is observed through decisions 
involving a choice of a technology to be adopted as well as a management choice which 
jointly determined pollution levels. In the second stage, participants filled out a short 
demographic survey after which they made a donation decision to the Chesapeake Bay 
foundation. The take home earnings of a participant comprised of a general income 
awarded to the individual, net production income resulting from management decisions, 
minus the choice of a conservation technology where adopted, and donations. 
 Although the experiment consists of 20 rounds, resulting in a panel structure for 
the data, this paper does not account for individually specific effects. Instead, a 
convenient estimation strategy that uses pooled data is adopted in the analysis. From the 
estimation results, a negative correlation between individual pollution and donation is 
found, suggesting that participants who polluted less were more likely to donate. 
Examining this relationship with respect to firm profits, it was observed that lower firm 
profits were correlated with larger donation sums. This negative correlation between 
individuals who earned less and donating more, suggests the existence of a context driven 
response. Note that these effects are subject to change once the panel data structure is 
accounted for. Thus, the results presented here are not ready to be cited. Improving upon 
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this paper, varying the context of the experimental setting can elicit varying responses 
driven by a pure change in context. Further, context might also help in replicating results 
across cultures, languages and populations in which contextual instructions might have a 
different meaning.  
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